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Romanian Political System 
the Parliamentary Elections 
of November 30, 2008
CRISTIAN PREDA
The elections of November 30, 2008 are the sixth electoral test organized since 
the fall of communism. These elections have been organized on the basis of a new 
electoral law -  the fourth in two decades1. All the post-December electoral regula­
tions have been inspired by a proportional philosophy. Until the 2008 scrutiny, the 
two Chambers were elected on the basis of a PR system with closed lists in pluri- 
nominal circumscriptions having as a territorial reference the county and a mecha­
nism  of all o ca tion of mandates based on the elect oral coeffi cient and the 
redistribution of the biggest remainders applied first at the level of the county and 
then at the national level. The magnitude of circumscriptions has varied from a law 
to another (see Table 1), being an "implicit threshold" quite important for small par­
ties. An electoral threshold of 3% was introduced in 1992, and then increased, after 
2000, to 5% for parties and, respectively 8-10%, depending of the number of par­
ties associated, for coalitions.
For the last decade, many voices of Romanian society, discontent by the vote 
based on lists, have called for a revolution of the electoral system, more precisely 
the "introduction of the uninominal vote". A modification in this sense was pro­
posed only in 2007 by the Association Pro Democratia and resumed by the Liber­
als of the Täriceanu government. This government has assumed responsibility, 
October 29, 2007, for a law proj ect that foresaw a mixt electoral system in which 
half of the members of Parliament were to be designated in uninominal colleges 
by a maj oritarian vote in one round, while the rest of mandates were to be ob­
tained, accordingly to a proportional rule, by the candidates that lost the competi­
tion. The project passed the two Chambers but was called for as unconstitutional 
by the President November 21, 2007, the Court declaring that several of its provi­
sions do not respect the Constitution2. In exchange, Traian Bäsescu called for a ref­
erendum for the adoption of a m ajoritarian voting system in two rounds, in 
circumscriptions with one seat. Inspired by the French system for the election of the 
National Assembly, the project, assumed also by the Partidul Democrat Liberal 
(PDL), stipulated that each deputy or senator was to be elected if he obtained half
1 The first post-communist elections were regulated by the Law-decree no. 92 of March 
1990. Those from the period 1992-2000 were held on the basis of the Laws no. 68 and 69 of July 
1992, modified several times. The 2004 elections were organized on the basis of the Laws no. 370 
and 373 of September 2004 and those of 2008 on the basis of the Law 35 of March 2008.
2 See the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania no. 1177/2007, which answered 
the Intimation of unconstitutionality of the Law for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and 
Senate and for the modification and completion of the Law no. 67/2004 for the election of the au­
thorities of the public local administration, of the Law of public local administration no. 215/2001 
and the Law no. 393/2004 regarding the Statute of local elected representatives.
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plus one of the votes of the electors inscribed on the lists or, when none of the can­
didates could achieve such a maj ority, if he occupied the first place in a second 
turn organized between the first two classified. Even if 81.36% of the electors de­
clared they were favorable to the proposal made by the President, the referendum 
was invalidated because only 26.51 of the electoral body was present at the polls, 
the law requiring at least half.
In the end, the Parliament adopted an electoral law in March 2008 that contin­
ued neither the PNL project, neither the President project. The Law introduced, at 
the proposal of a social-democrat senator1, an eclectic electoral formula, according 
to which "deputies and senators are chosen in uninominal colleges.. .through a uni- 
nominal vote according to the principle of proportional representation" (art. 5 p. 1). 
Col leges, sub-uni ties of circum scrip tions, are organized on the basis of a norm of 
representation of a deputy for each 70 000 citizens and a senator for 160 000 citi­
zens. The college is uninominal because each "political competitor" submits one 
candidature. But the distribution of mandates is made accordingly to contradic­
tory methods, a combination between a majoritarian formula and a proportional 
one: as such, win mandates all those candidates that manage to obtain minimum 
50% plus one vote in the colleges in which they competed; if they do not achieve 
this majority, we resort to aspectively at the country level, on the basis of the aggre­
gation of the biggest remainders (art. 48), reuniting for each party the votes granted 
to candidates that they endorsed. The law created for the first time a circumscrip­
tion outside the country and introduced an alternative threshold: if a politi cal for­
mation does not obtain the percent ages al ready mentioned it h proportional 
distribution based on the same method of electoral quotas, calculated at two levels 
-  in each circumscription (county) and, reas to occupy at least six first places in the 
deputy colleges and three in the senatorial ones to enter the Parliament. In ex­
change, the March 2008 law specifies that in the case of partial elections a system 
of vote a l'anglaise, that is, majoritarian in one tour (art. 48, let. 17) is used.
The electoral body shrunk from 1990 to 1992, so as to grow then constantly un­
til 2008 when it arrived to almost 18.5 million electors. This evolution was not bereft 
of surprises: for example, at the 2000 general elections the electoral body amounted 
to 17 699 727 voters, a number 2 millions bigger than the one from the local elections 
organized 6 months earlier, when the permanent lists included only 15 641 534 elec­
tors. In exchange, as Table 2 indicates, electoral participation followed a downward 
curb: more than 6/7 in 1990, 3/4 in 1992 and 1996, so as to oscillate around 2/3 in 
2000 and 2004, descending dramatically at less than 40% in 2008.
The proportion of valid bulletins, that attest the degree of civic compe tency, 
was constantly of 93-95% with only one exception, the 1992 elections when 12% of 
the votes deposed in the urns were annulled (see Table 3). Unfortunately, until the 
last elections, it was not known how many of the votes annulled were the expres­
sion of protest or the refuse of the "political class". The 2008 law introduced the dis­
tinction between annulled and blank votes, differentiating thus the bulletins on which 
the stamp was not applied correctly and, respectively the bulletins introduced in the 
urn without a choice for a candidate made by the voter. As Table 3 bis shows, at 
the November 2008 elections, around 2% of the votes expressed were blank.
1 The paternity of this formula was reclaimed by the PSD deputy Anghel Stanciu, in an in­
terview to the Romanian section of BBC, March 9, 2008.
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Between 1990 and 2008, the total number of formations that deposed candida­
tures at the general elections, alone or in alliances, was of 200 (see Table 4). Sixty 
percent of the competitors deposed lists once and only 13 of them participated to 
all the six elections held between the period 1990-2008, of which 11 are, in fact, mi­
nority formations (Lipoveni, Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, Magyars, Turks, 
Greek, Czech, Slovaks, Polish, Serbian, and Ukrainian). The two parties present 
six times in front of the electorate are the Partidul Ecologist Roman and the Par- 
tidul National Liberal (PNL) that deposed candidatures also in the framework of 
alliances, PER 3 times and PNL twice1. The solution of alliances was embraced in 
fact at each electoral test but became less and less frequent as time passed: indeed, 
if in 1992 the 79 lists included 92 political formations, at the 2008 elections only 
two of the 29 competitors that entered the competition for the inferior Chamber 
were alliances2. Paradoxically, from the six elections organized in Romania after 
1989, the last four have been won by a coalition or an electoral alliance: after the 
victory of the Frontul Salvärii Nationale in 1990 and respectively of the Frontul 
Democrat al Salvärii Nationale two years later, the 1996 elections were won by the 
Conventia Democratä Romanä, in 2000 the Polul Democrat-Social din Romania 
imposed itself, four years later -  the Uniunea Nationalä PSD+PUR, and in 2008, 
the Alianta politicä PSD-PC had the most votes.
The number of parties that submitted a candidature decreased with time. If 
we compare the lists submitted at the six post-communist electoral consultations, 
we shall see that in a first moment the number of parties is reduced only in what 
regards the elections for the Senate. In this case the decrease is not the effect of ju ­
ridical constraints (such as the electoral threshold) but a result of the strategy of 
the formations of the national minorities: after the 1992 elections, these realized 
that the Senate is inaccessible for them and stopped submitting lists for the supe­
rior Chamber. Only the coming into force of the law of 2003 produced a significant 
reduction of the participants to the election: if in 1990, to the mandates of the infe­
rior Chamber, aspired 71 political formations, in 2004 these were only 52, includ­
ing here the formations of the minorities; at the Senate, the decrease is even more 
important: from 59 in the first year of post-communism to 25 at the 2004 elections. 
At the first European elections, held November 25, 2007 13 lists of parties and an 
independent candidate participated to the competition, whereas, in 2008 we have 
10 parties in competition for the Senate and 11 for the Chamber of Deputies (see 
Table 5). Not only the number of parties but also the number of their members de­
creased after 2003. Thus, the 27 parties existing in 2003 had together 1 735 430 par­
tisans, that is, 10% of the citizens that have the right to vote, whereas at the end of 
2007, as table 6 shows, the 21 parties had in total 1 302 417 members.
The number of parliamentary parties resulting of the post-communist elec­
tions varies, as table 7 indicates, between 5 and 12 in the Senate and, respectively, 
between 24 and 27 at the Chamber of Deputies, the latter including the formations 
of minorities that do not surpass the threshold but gain representation with one
1 For the problem of volatility see Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party Systems 
after the Dictatorship. Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits During the Transition and 
Post-transition Stages“, in Geoffrey PRIDHAM & Paul G. LEWIS (edited by), Stabilising Fragile 
Democracies, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp. 70-71.
2 These are the Political Alliance PSD + PC and the Partidul Verde Ecologist, an alliance of the 
Partidul Verde and PER. The numbers indicated include the formations of national minorities.
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mandate, formations which number rose from 11 in 1990 to 13 two years later, to 
15 in 1996 and to 18 after the 2000 elections. The 2000 elections represent a key mo­
ment in the consolidation of the Romanian political stage. At the 2004 elections we 
have practically the same parties with the specification that two of the parties 
(PDSR and PSDR) had merge (under the name of PSD). In exchange, the 2008 elec­
tions eliminate a parliamentary party, the Partidul Romania Mare (PRM).
An important parameter for the characterization of the political system, the 
effective number of parties calculated after the formula of Marku Laakso and Rein 
Taagepera portrays a dramatic instability of the Romanian political spectrum: in 
19 years the political system of Romania experienced three different formulas be­
cause it passed from the quasi-absolute domination of one party in 1990 to the 
multi party model without a dominant party between 1992 and 1996, so as to gain 
in 2000 the traits of a multi party system with a dominant party. After the 2004 elec­
tions, Romania had again a multi party system without a dominant party, a fact 
confirmed after the 2008 elections (see Table 8). The average value of the effective 
number of parties (N = 3.69) situates the Romanian system in the table established 
by Lijphart after the study of 36 democracies, very close to the one of Iceland (3.72) 
with the difference that the number of elections that took place in Romania is 
smaller, and the difference between the minimum and the maximum value is big­
ger than in the Icelandic case. If we exclude the 1990 elections, than the average 
effective number of parties has the value of 4.10 (with a minimum of 3.19 and a 
maximum of 5.18), the Romanian system becoming closer to the Belgian one1.
The dimensions of the legislative have been, during the entire post-communist 
period, favorable to the expression of a very high proportionality because the Parlia­
ment is, as Table 9 shows, oversized: in fact, far from respecting "the rule of cubic 
root" -  conforming to which the total number of mandates of the inferior Chamber 
tends to be equal to the cubic root of the number of the population -  the Romanian 
legislative corresponds to a population of 36 million people, much more than the 
actual population of the country. But this favorable condition was not put to a good 
use. Between 1992 and 2000 the electoral system produced what Daniel Barbu called 
"proportional non-representativeness"2, in the sense that a considerable number of 
votes were granted to parties that did not enter the Parliament, being redistributed 
to parties that surpassed the legal electoral threshold: for example in 2000, 20% of 
the choices of the voters, or in absolute terms around 2.3 million votes for the Cham­
ber and 2.2 million for the Senate did not find their political expression in Parlia­
ment. In 2004, the weight of these "squandered" votes decreased significantly in 
both Chambers, reaching around 11-13%. At the elections for the European Parliament 
of November 2007, the five parties that obtained mandates (PD, PSD, PNL, PLD, 
UDMR) and the independent candidate that managed to gain a seat in PE achieved 
together 4 197 345 of votes of the 5 122 226 valid votes, thereby squandered votes 
represented 924 881 votes (18.05%). The elections of November 2008 constituted in 
this sense a surprise, as they reduced the percentage to 6-7% (see Table 10).
Votes' redistribution in favor of parties that passed the electoral threshold 
was beneficial primarily to the party classed on the first place. Sometimes, as in
1 See Arend LIJPHART, Patterns o f  Democracy.Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999 -  quoted after M odele ale 
democratiei, Romanian transl. by C. Constantinescu, Polirom, Iasi, 2000, p. 85.
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absenta, Nemira, Bucuresti, 1999, pp. 163-180.
Romanian Political Science Review •  vol. IX  •  no. 1 •  2009
The Romanian Political System after the Parliamentary Elections 13
1990 or 2000, the electoral bonus was of 10%, other times the difference between 
the percentage of votes and that of mandates was minimal. In 2008, as it can be 
seen from Table 11, this difference barely surpassed 1%. What is even more inter­
esting is the fact that the increase in non-representativeness was accompanied by 
a progressive reduction of the effective number of mandates allocated through the 
redistribution of votes granted to the parties that did not pass the electoral thresh­
old, even though, especially in the case of the Senate, this proportion remained, 
including in 2004 of over 50%. In 2008 the system of transformation of votes into 
mandates changed, the candidates that obtained half plus one of the votes in the 
college in which they ran won a seat of deputy or senator, while the other man­
dates were redis trib uted proportionally at the level of the county and then, again 
proportionally, at the national level. In spite of the majoritarian bonus the system 
evolved practically in the parameters of 2004 as Table 12 shows. It is interesting to 
remark that the number of mandates distributed following the "direct" victory in 
colleges was of 85 at the Chamber (around 27%) and 31 at the Senate (around 
22%). This means that the number of mandates distributed at the level of the 
county -  160, respectively 41 -  was the determining factor in the creation of the 
general equilibrium of representation.
Electoral disproportionality measured with the help of the formula of Mi­
chael Gallagher is in the case of the Romanian political system of 18.47, a value 
that places it between the last two cases of democ ra cies in the clas si fi ca tion real­
ized by Arend Lijphart, more exactly between Jamaica (17.75) and France (21.08). 
This positioning is surprising if we take into account the fact that the Jamaican sys­
tem is a pluralitarian one and the French one a majoritarian one while the Roma­
nian system is -  at least through its intentions -  a proportional system. In the list 
realized by Lijphart the closest PR systems by their characteristics to the Roma­
nian system are those of Venezuela (G=14.41), Costa Rica (G=13.65) and Columbia 
(G-10.62), all three considered as veritable examples of the mode in which can be 
perverted the proportional logic. Overcoming the disequilibria produced in these 
three countries, the Romanian system is the most disproportional PR known system. 
More than this: Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica are, as Romania, presidential 
democracies but the disproportionality which affects them is due before every­
thing to presidential disproportionality and not to the legislative one; in Romania 
the exact contrary occurs, while in our case legislative disproportionality varies as 
it can be seen in table 13, between 4.36 and 9.38, in Venezuela, Colombia and Costa 
Rica, according to Lijphart1, the same parameter varies between 2.96 and 4.28. The 
majoritarian effects of the Romanian political-electoral system remain very signifi­
cant even after the last elections, although somehow diminished.
The voting system introduced in 2008 has had maj or inequitable effects. As 
Table 14 shows, there is no correspondent between the number of mandates won, 
the number of first placed seats obtained in colleges and the number of colleges 
won with absolute majorities: PSD is the first from the point of view of seats won 
with 50%+1, the first one from the point of view of votes obtained at the national 
level, but the second one from the point of view of mandates won. PNL has 37 
first seats in the Chamber (4 being won with more than 50%+1) and 15 first seats 
at the Senate (1 with a majority in the college), but 65 deputy seats and 28 sena­
tors. PDL obtained 196 first seats in colleges and only 166 mandates. If we take
1 Arend LIJPHART, Patterns o f  Democracy.. .cit., pp. 156 and 159.
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into consideration the biggest circumscription (see Table 14-3), the one represented 
by the municipality of Bucharest, we observe that in the 28 colleges, only 3 candi­
dates gained the mandate with more than half of the votes of the citizens who came 
to the urns in the college (2 from PSD and one from PDL). PNL, which was third in 
25 of the 28 colleges, obtaining also a second place and two fourth places, reached 5 
mandates. PDL was in the first place in 20 colleges gaining 12 mandates, and PSD, 
winner of the other 8 first places won 11 mandates, of which 4 on the second place!
The 2008 elections did not modify radically the landscape of political parties. 
In fact, only ten of the 200 parties that have participated to elections between 1990 
and 2008 have managed to pass at least three electoral tests, obtaining actually 
each time, between 85% and 98% of the parliamentary mandates. Thus, these ten 
parties are those that played a decisive role in Romanian political life (see Table 15). 
The 2008 elections brought about two novelties: the first is the loosing by the PRM 
of the statute of parliamentary party after four legislatures in which it had be­
tween 3 and 20 % of the mandates. The second novelty is brought by the third 
consecutive entry into Parliament of the representatives of the Partidul Conserva­
tor (PC): as in the past this thing happened in the framework of an alliance with 
the social-democrats. As Table 15 shows the other 9 parties had different strategies 
in what concerns the access to the legislative and the participation to government 
was not conditioned by the embracement of one of these strategies. Derived from 
a "common branch" -  called in 1990 Frontul Salvärii Nationale -  PDSR and PD 
have chosen different paths to impose themselves in front of the electorate. Under 
the name of FDSN in 1992, of PDSR in 1996 and 2000, of PSD after 2001, the party 
regrouped around Ion Iliescu participated alone to the electoral tests of 1992 and 
1996 (winning the first and loosing the second) and in coalition after 2000,2004 and 
2008 (winning elections in the three cases but participating to the government only 
after 2000 and 2008). Partidul Democrat which became after December 2007, De­
mocrat Liberal, presented itself alone in 1992 (under the name of FSN) as in 2000 
and 2008, respectively, in coalition with PSDR in 1996 and with PNL in 2004 manag­
ing to enter the government not only in these two cases, but also after the elections 
of 2008. Partidul Social Democrat Roman (PSDR), alone in 1990, became member of 
the Conventia Democraticä din Romania in 1992, of the Uniunea Social-Democratä 
in 1996 and of the Polul Democratiei Sociale din Romania (PDSR) in 2000, these last 
two alliances allowing it to participate to the government. The fourth successful 
party, Partidul Ecologist Roman was alone in 1990, than a member of the CDR in 
1992 and 1996, elections following which it obtained a few mandates. Participating 
once again alone in 2000 and 2004, it was not able to send representatives in Parlia­
ment and in 2008, PER allied itself with Partidul Verde inside the Alianta Partidul 
Verde Ecologist but failed again to enter the Parliament. At their turn, Partidul Na­
tional Täränesc Crestin Democrat (PNTCD) and Partidul National Liberal chose 
different strategies: PNL had its own lists in 1990, 1992, 2000 and 2008 (the second 
time missing the entry in Parliament) and was part of the winning coalition (CDR) 
in 1996; in 2004 it submitted common candidatures together with the democrats, 
under the name of Alianta Dreptate si Adevär PNL-PD, managing to form the gov­
ernment even if they came up second at the legislatives. After it submitted its own 
list in 1990, PNTCD opted for the variant of the coalition for the electoral tests organ­
ized between 1992 and 2000, this formula bringing to it the second place in 1992, the 
first place in 1996 and total failure at the 2000 elections (under the name CDR2000). 
In 2004 it failed again to enter the Parliament this time on its own lists and in 2008
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it stopped presenting candidatures. Uniunea Democratä a M aghiarilor din 
Romania (UDMR) passed alone all the six electoral tests, with an average of 25 
deputies and 11 senators. Partidul Unitätii Nationale a Romanilor (PUNR) sur­
passed the threshold both in coalition (in 1990, together with the Partidul Republi­
can) and when it had its own lists (1992 and 1996); in 2000, associated with Partidul 
National Roman it failed to enter the Parliament; the same thing happened four 
years later when it had no more electoral allies; the party was erased from the Reg­
ister of Political Parties in 2006. Finally, Partidul Romania Mare participated alone 
both to the four victorious electoral tests and to the failed one of 2008.
If we don't follow the electoral strategies of parties but the ideological rela­
tions between them, departing from the criteria used after 1989 to describe the 
politics of Central and Eastern Europe1, we have a more complex picture, with 
nine ideological families. As it can be observed easily from Table 16, four of these 
families -  the greens, the extreme left, the minimalist agrarians and the defenders 
of particular interests -  have an insignificant presence between one and two per­
cents, even though sometimes, as it was the case with the greens at the beginning 
of the transition, they managed to send elected representatives in the Chambers. 
The other families have a sinuous evolution. The scene is dominated by social-de- 
mocrats who have an electoral mean of over 40 percents and who never descended 
below 30%, being divided until the 2004 elections including when one of the par­
ties of this direction -  Partidul Democrat -  made a radical ideological realignment, 
entering the family of European popular. The liberals and modernist conserva­
tives are just as divided as the social-democrats with a mean of over 20% with 
very strong variations from one electoral test to the other, but with a spectacular 
consolidation in the last years, which led to the 2008 situation when two right par­
ties -  PNL and PDL -  had together more than half of the options expressed at the 
urns. On the third place from the point of view of the electoral score is the family 
of national-populist and extreme-right with a mean of 10.81 in the six elections: 
after a historic maximum in 2000, when PRM gathered one fifth of the votes ex­
pressed, at the 2008 elections this family descended at 5 percents, results that add 
in fact the performances of PRM (3.15%) and the Partidul Noua Generatie-PNG 
(2.27%). On the following place in the general classification, with almost 9 per­
cents, is the family of national minorities formed of UDMR and a number of 11-18 
formations of other m inorities. Finally, on the fifth place, organized around 
PNTCD, is the agrarian Christian-popular family and of the identitarian right, 
with an average score of 7 percents, but in a strong downward since 20002.
Because of the division of political families and the profound polarization of 
the party system, many times the articulation of maj orities is placed under the 
sign of the unpredictable and of fragility. This fact is even more clear as, except­
ing the 1990 elections that had as a result "a  won m ajority", the electoral system 
had as a main political consequence the appearance of "natural m inorities" and, 
in consequence, the negotiation of the formation of plural parliamentary majori­
ties and, in several cases, instable. It has to be added that in three out of four cases,
1 Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo MEDINA LOCKHART, "La geographie electorale de 
l'Europe centre-orientale", in Jean-M ichel DE WAELE (ed.), Partis politiques et democraties en Eu­
rope Centrale et Orientale, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2002, pp. 17-34.
2 For other details see Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele si sistemul politic 
din Romania, Nemira, Bucuresti, 2008, pp. 108-117. The following fragments resume, in a form 
updated with the results of 2008, paragraphs of the quoted volume, specially pp. 123-126.
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respectively in 1992, 2000 and 2004 these parliamentary majorities were not found 
integrally at the level of the government formula, the cabinets Nicolae Väcäroiu, 
Adrian Nästase and Cälin Popescu-Täriceanu being minority cabinets (see Table 17). 
Let's remark finally the decisive weight of the electoral formula that allowed, be­
tween 1992 and 2004, that coalitions with a minority of votes have a maj ority of 
parliamentary mandates. The 2008 elections are inscribed in a different logic, the 
"grand coalition" realized by the PSD and PDL had at the urns two thirds of the 
votes expressed.
The political color of these majorities and its adversaries is changing signifi­
cantly after each election. Between 1990 and 1992 we have the powerful domina­
tion of a left linked rather to the neo-communist1 identity than to the European 
values: intolerant with its political adversaries, arriving to the use of force (with 
the occasion of the incursions of miners in Bucharest in May 1990 and September 
1991), nostalgic of a totalitarian economic past, with cultural options constructed 
around a national identity defined on an ethnic basis and opposing the occidentali- 
zation of the public space, this left had against it an alliance rather informal and, in 
any case, incoherent2, constituted by the Liberals (PNL), the fraction PNTCD and 
the members of the Magyar minority (in total around 16% of the votes in 1990); 
beginning with 1991 after it eliminated Petre Roman, the left directed by President 
Iliescu on the path of the radical refuse of politi cal and economic reform found in 
the small liberal party an ally of circumstance to support a government led by 
Theodor Stoloj an and which was meant to prepare the new elections. Between 
1992 and 1996, the nationalist-identitarian options and conservative of the eco­
nomic and social structures of the previous regime formed a weak major ity (42% 
of votes, 51% in mandates), but which knew to impose itself in front of a liberal 
right lacking unity (6.5% of the votes in Parliament versus 3.6% outside of it), in 
front of a Christian-agrarian family that held only 10% of the parliamentary seats, 
face to a social-democrat adversary (FSN/PD) refused for a long time as a partner 
by the supporters of modernization (10% of votes) and in front of a Magyar minor­
ity which was reduced to the statute of "committed spectator" (7.5%). Between 
1996 and 2000, the political system was defined by the fragile equilibrium between 
a pro-occident and liberal in economy coalition, but very divided on social and 
administrative problems (with almost 50% of votes -  CDR3, USD and UDMR, each 
in part being already a coalition), and, on the other side, a left losing speed (PDSR) 
and which made an appeal, once in opposition, to the national-populists and radi- 
cal-extremists, nostalgic of communism regrouped around PUNR and PRM. After 
the 2000 elections, social-democracy -  still lacking unity, but under a different for­
mula (PDSR and PSDR merging against PD) -  opened its gates to a collaboration 
with the party of the Magyar minority (UDMR), abandoning the alliance with the 
extreme-right (PRM). The occidentalist right lost thus not only the support of the 
Christian-democrats (that could not enter the Parliament anymore and who ex­
1 For such a characterization, see for example Guy HERMET, Le passage a la democratic, 
Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 1996, p. 72.
2 The lack of unity and incoherence of the opposition in this period were already remarked 
by Tom GALLAGHER, in an article that compares the reinvention of democracy in Romania and 
Portugal, „The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy. Romania and 
Portugal Compared“, in Geoffrey PRIDHAM & Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Demo­
cracies, cit., p. 211.
3 An analysis of CDR can be found in Dan PAVEL, Iulia HUIU, "Nu putem reusi decat m -  
preuna". O istorie analitica a Conventiei Democratice, 1989-2000, Polirom, Iasi, 2003.
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perienced at their turn at the beginning of 2001 internal division), but also that of 
UDMR, who became a faithful member of the new parliamentary maj ority. The 
2004 elections created an unseen situation in Romanian politics. Three are the 
traits of this situation. In the first place, the elections confirmed the parliamentary 
statute of the six parties that had entered the Chambers four years before. In other 
words: for the first time after 1989 there was no new party entering the Parliament 
and no party that lost its parliamentary status. What changed was the weight of 
mandates, the big winner in relation to the 2000-2004 legislature being PNL, and 
the big loser -  PRM. In the second place, contradicting (almost) all the sociological 
and politologi cal es ti ma tions, the elec tor ate voted one winner at the parliamen­
tary elections -  that is the National Union PSD+PUR (with around 37% of the 
votes) -  and a winner for the presidential elections supported by the second placed 
at the legislatives -  Alianta DA (which had won 31.3% of the votes). The third nov­
elty resides in the post-electoral faith of alliances realized for elections. If in 1996 
and 2000 the coalitions that had won elections formed the govern ment, in 2004, 
the winning coalition in elections (formed of PSD and PUR) broke, PUR passing to 
the side of the Alianta PNL-PD to form the government, after having supported, 
in a first moment, December 20, 2004, PSD and PRM for the election of the presi­
dents of the two Chambers. The victory in the presidential elections of the candi­
date of the Alianta DA, Traian Bäsescu, led thus to the distribution of power, a 
natu ral corollary in fact, of the proportionalist effects of the legislative election it­
self. Cälin Popescu-Täriceanu became prime minister with the vote of 265 of the 
465 senators and deputies from PNL, PD, UDMR and PUR, but also from the na­
tional minorities. It was a maj ority more eclectic than the ones that succeeded 
themselves since 1990, that is more than the revolutionary and national-identi- 
tarian left (of 1990-1992), more than the left conservatism with a powerful national­
ist tint (from 1992-1996), than the center-right liberalism, ambiguous and varied, 
open to radical occidentalization (of 1996-2000), and more than social-democracy 
looking for a reformist definition in economy and of a protecting vision in the so­
cial field (2000-2004). The situation changed radically at the end of 2006 and the 
beginning of 2007 when PUR (which had become Partidul Conservator) left the 
government, and then the PD was eliminated from the cabinet. Instead of a quad­
ripartite cabinet, April 2nd, 2007 a bicolor government, PNL-UDMR, was sworn in. 
As the government defined itself primarily in opposition to the president it was in 
fact the creation of a regime of cohabitation with an ultra-minority government 
supported by a coalition that did not want to display itself publicly; a coali tion 
which meant however, a massive political bloc of almost four fifths of the entire 
legislative (see Table 18). Thus, the weakest direct support created the most com­
pact direct support. The 2008 elections brought in exchange to the government a 
bi color coa li tion PSD-PDL. Its crea tion was possible as, for the fourth time after 
the fall of communism the organizers of elections went to the opposition.
Since 1996, Romania has a democratic culture based on discontinuity or rup­
ture and not on consensus or equilibrium. This aspect is important for Romania 
which knew the unique party under communism and in the inter-war period had 
what Mattei Dogan called "governmental Parliaments and not parliamentary gov­
ernm ents"1, in so much as the organizer of the election designated by the King 
won without mistake the elections.
1 Mattei DOGAN, „Romania, 1919-1938", in Myron WEINER, Ergun OZBUDUN (ed.), Com­
petitive Elections in Developing Countries, Duke University Press, 1987, pp. 369-389.
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TABLES
Table 1
Magnitude o f  Circumscriptions (1990-2008)
Chamber of Deputies Senate
1990 1992-2000 2004 2008 1990 1992-2000 2004 2008
1 Alba 7 6 5 2 3 2
2 Arad 8 7 8 3
Arges 11 10 9 3 43
4 Bacau 12 11 10 3 5 4
5 Bihor 11 9 3 4
6 Bistrita-Nasaud 6 5 4 2
7 Botosani 8 7 6 2 3
8 Brasov 12 9 9 8 3 4
9 Braila 7 6 5 2
10 Buzau 9 7 3
11 Caras-Severin 7 5 2
12 Calarasi 6 5 2
1 3 Cluj 12 11 10 3 5 4
14 Constanta 12 11 10 3 5 4
15 Covasna 4 2
16 Dambovita 10 8 3
17 Dolj 13 11 10 4 5
18 Galati 11 9 3 4
19 Giurgiu 5 4 2
20 Gorj 6 2| 3| 2
21 Harghita 6 5 2
22 Hunedoara 9 8 7 3
2 3 Ialomita 5 4 2
24 Iasi 14 12 4 5
25 Maramures 9 8 7 3
26 Mehedinti 5 4 2
27 Mures 10 9 8 3 4
28 Neamt 10 8 3
CO4
29 Olt 9 7 3
30 Prahova 15 12 4 5
31 Satu-Mare 7 6 5 2 3 2
32 Salaj 5 4 2
Sibiu 8 6 33 3
34 Suceava 12 10 3 4
35 Teleorman 8 7 6 3
36 Timis 12 10 9 10 3 4
37 Tulcea 5 4 2
38 Vaslui 8 7 2 3
39 Valcea 7 6 2 3
40 Vrancea 7 6 2
41 Mun. Bucuresti 39 8
<N9<N 14 13 12
42 Sect. Agr. Ilfov - 4 - 2
4 3 Foreign countries - - - 4 - - - 2
Total 387 328 314 316 119 143 137 137
Romanian Political Science Review •  vol. IX  •  no. 1 •  2009
The Romanian Political System after the Parliamentary Elections 19
In 1990 the numbering of circumscriptions and the number of deputies and senators 
was done on the basis of the law-decree no. 92/March 1990, through the Government deci­
sion no. 283 of March 19, 1990 (publ. in Monitorul Oficial, no. 39/21 March 1990); as the Elec­
toral law tolerated, through art. 14 a deviation of 15% in accordance with the population of 
the circumscriptions, the number of deputies was not of 387 as the law-decree mentioned, 
but of 397. The electoral law of 1992 fixed at its turn the election in circumscriptions (art. 3. 
para. 1), and in annex 1 described their magnitude; then appears, as a new circumscription, 
the Agricultural Sector Ilfov. If at the next elections, of 1996, circumscriptions remained un­
changed, in exchange, OUG no. 129/30 June 2000 introduced a new numbering of electoral 
circumscriptions: if the numbering of 1992 reproduced the alphabetical order of counties, 
with the exception of the "Agricultural Sector Ilfov", which was placed, under number 42, 
at the end of the list, after "the Municipality of Bucharest", the June 2000 ordinance intro­
duced the Ilfov circumscription between Iasi and Maramures and re-numbered the follow­
ing sections. The ordinance also modified the magnitude of some of the circumscriptions; 
the reform of the magnitude was limited: it consisted in the decrease with one mandate (in 
the Cluj county) of the number of deputies and the reduction with one unity of the magni­
tude of the senate circumscriptions of the Alba, Gorj and Satu Mare counties. The number 
of deputies of the 2000-2004 legislature is thus of 327 (to which are added the deputies of 
national minorities), and that of senators is of 140. The 2004 electoral law reduced the mag­
nitude both at the Chamber and at the Senate, limiting in this way the number of organiza­
tion of minorities that can be represented in the inferior Chamber to 18 (cf. art. 4, para. 2). 
The 2008 electoral law made some minimal changes: the magnitude was reduced in several 
counties so as to include in almost the same limits seats for the new circumscription cre­
ated, that of Romanian in foreign countries. For the rest the number of deputies of Arad 
was increased with a seat after the vote. If the average magnitude can be regarded as an 
“implicit threshold" and if the reasonable report between the two variables is S=75% (M+1), 
where S is the threshold and M the average magnitude (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of 
Democracy...cit., pp. 149-150), than in the Romanian case, the average magnitude consti­
tutes an obstacle for representativeness. At the 2004 elections, we have a level of magnitude 
of 3.26 for the Senate and 7.9 for the Chamber and, thus, an implicit threshold of over 17% 
for the Senate (three times bigger than the explicit threshold for parties) and, respectively of 
over 8% for the Chamber (that is more than the explicit threshold fixed in 2000 for the coali­
tions of two parties).
Table 2
Electoral Body and Participation
Election ALEP APU %
AG -  20.05.1990 17 200 722 14 825 017 86,18
AG -  27.09.1992 16 380 663 12 496 430 76,28
AP2 -  11.10.1992 16 380 663 12 153 810 74,19
AG -  03.11.1996 17 218 654 13 088 388 76,01
AP2 -  17.11.1996 17 230 654 13 078 883 75,90
AG -  26.11.2000 17 699 727 11 559 458 65,31
AP2 -  10.12.2000 17 711 757 10 184 715 57,50
AG -  28.10.2004 18 449 676 10 794 653 58,51
AP2 -  12.12.2004 18 316 104 10 112 262 55,21
EUR -25.11.2007 18 224 597 5 370 171 29,47
AG -  30.11.2008 18 464 274 7 238 871 39,20
Romanian Political Science Review •  vol. IX  •  no. 1 •  2009
20 C R IST IA N  PREDA
The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of 
presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second 
column indicates the number of electors according to the permanent electoral lists (ALEP), 
the third the number of voters present at the urns (APU), and the fourth electoral participa­
tion, in percentages (%). At the 1990 elections, the Central Electoral Bureau mentioned a 
different number of voters present at the urns at the three elections for the Chamber of 
Deputies (CD), Senate (S) and Presidency (P), and so I also calculated participation for each 
one: in the table appears the number from the CD; for the Senate, APU was 14 825 764 
(86,19%), and at the Presidency, 14 826 616 (86,19%).
Table 3
Valid Votes Expressed at the Post-1989 Elections
Election VVE %VVE- APU %VVE -  ALEP
AG -  20.05.1990
13 707 159 (CD)
13 956 180 (S)
14 378 693 (P)
92,45 (CD) 
94,13 (S) 
96,97 (P)
79,68 (CD) 
81,13 (S) 
83,59 (P)
AG -  27.09.1992
10 880 252 (CD)
10 964 818 (S)
11 898 856 (P)
87,06 (CD) 
87,74 (S) 
95,21 (P)
66,42 (CD) 
66,93 (S) 
72,63 (P)
AP2 -  11.10.1992 12 034 636 99,01 73,46
AG -  03.11.1996
12 238 746 (CD) 
12 287 671 (S)
12 652 900 (P)
93,50 (CD) 
93,88 (S) 
96,67 (P)
71,07 (CD) 
71,36 (S) 
73,48 (P)
AP2 -  17. 11.1996 12 972 485 99,18 75,28
AG -  26.11.2000
10 839 424 (CD)
10 891 910 (S)
11 212 974 (P)
93,77 (CD) 
94,22 (S) 
97,00 (P)
61,24 (CD) 
61,53 (S) 
63,35 (P)
AP2 -  10.12.2000 10 020 870 98,39 56,57
AG -  28.11.2004
10 188 106 (CD) 
10 231 476 (S)
10 452 205 (P)
94,38 (CD) 
94,78 (S) 
96,83 (P)
55,22 (CD) 
55,46 (S) 
56,65
AP2 -  12.12.2004 10 008 314 98,97 54,64
EUR -  25.11.2007 5 122 228 95,38 28,10
AG -  30.11.2008 6 886 794 (CD) 6 888 055 (S)
95.14 (CD)
95.15 (S)
37.29 (CD)
37.30 (S)
The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of 
presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second 
indicates the total number of valid votes expressed (VVE) and the third the percentage of 
valid votes expressed in relation to the number of electors present at the urns (%VVE -  
APU), and the fourth column the percentage of valid votes expressed, cal cu lated in rela tion 
to the number of electors in the permanent electoral lists (%VVE -  ALEP). The data was in­
dicated -  where it was the case -  separately for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S), 
respectively for the presidential elections (P) and the European ones (EUR).
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Table 3 bis
Null Votes at the Post-1989 Elections
Election TVN TVN %
AG -  20.05.1990 1 117 858 (CD) 
869 584 (S)
447 923 (P)
7,54 (CD) 
5,86 (S) 
3,02 (P)
AG -  27.09.1992 1 591 071 (CD) 
1 507 623 (S) 
580 017 (P)
12,73 (CD) 
12,06 (S) 
4,64 (P)
AP2 -  11.10.1992 116 092 0,95
AG -  3.11.1996 834 687 (CD) 
785 977 (S) 
426 545 (P)
6,37 (CD) 
6,00 (S) 
3,25 (P)
AP2 -  17.11.1996 102 579 0,78
AG -  26.12.2000 706 761 (CD) 
653 834 (S) 
484 643 (P)
6,11 (CD) 
5,66 (S) 
3,00 (P)
AP2 -  10.12.2000 160 264 1,57
AG -  28.11.2004 599 641 (CD) 
556 128 (S) 
339 010 (P)
5,55 (CD) 
5,15 (S) 
3,14 (P)
AP2 -  12.12.2004 103 245 1,02
EUR -  25.11.2007 246 555 4,62
AG -  30.11.2008 210 994 (CD) 
172 884 (S)
2,91 (CD) 
2,39 (S)
The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of 
presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second 
one indicates the total number of null votes (TVN), and the last one the percentage of null 
votes in comparison to the number of electors present at the urns (TVN%), at the elections 
for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S) and Presidency (P). In 2008, were counted for 
the first time the blank votes: these were 139 139 at the Chamber (1.92%) and 176.217 for the 
Senate (2.43%).
Table 4
Electoral Volatility
No. participations Electoral years NP
One participation
1990 30
1992 27
1996 22
2000 23
2004 14
2008 2
Two participations
1990 & 1992 21
1992 & 1996 3
1996 & 2000 5
2000 & 2004 2
2004 & 2008 1
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No. participations Electoral years NP
1990 & 1992 & 1996 4
1990 & 1996 & 2000 1
1992 & 1996 & 2000 6
Three participations 1992 & 2000 & 2004 1
1996 & 2000 & 2004 3
1996 & 2004 & 2008 1
2000 & 2004 & 2008 3
1990-2000 3
Four participations 1992-2004 2
1996-2008 3
Five participations 1990-2004 21992-2008 8
Six participations 1990-2008 13
Total 200
The calculation was made keeping in mind the following rules: I numbered the parties 
and the unions indifferent if they participated with their own lists or on the lists of alli­
ances; the simple change of name of a party does not mean the appearance of a new actor; 
in exchange, I considered that a party disappears if it is absorbed by another formation un­
der the name of this one or under a new one. I considered that Partidul Democrat Liberal 
(ex PD (FSN), ex PD) and, respectively Partidul Social Democrat (ex FDSN, ex PDSR) had 
five electoral participations (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008); I kept into account the fact 
that, beyond their common origin -  Frontul Salvarii Nationale - , each of the two parties 
followed a path of re-foundation beginning in March 1992.
Table 5
Parties Inscribed and Lists Submitted at the General Elections
Date Partiesinscribed
Lists submitted
Chamber Senate
28 January 1990 30
20 May 1990 80 71 59
27 September 1992 155 79 65
15 July 1993 159
1 October 1994 161
1 January 1996 200
3 November 1996 75 64 37
26 November 2000 73 68 37
28 November 2004 64 52 25
30 November 2008 38 29 10
The information about the parties inscribed comes from several sources: George 
VOICU, Pluripartidismul. O teorie a democratiei, All, Bucuresti, 1998, p. 213 (for 1990 and 
1994), from the collection Partide politice, Agentia de presa Rompres, Bucuresti, 1993 (for 1992 
and 1993); Alexandru RADU, Nevoia schimbarii. Un deceniu de pluripartidism in Romania, Edi- 
tura "Ion Cristoiu", Bucuresti, 2000, p. 16 (for 1996; at pp. 341-345, the same author indicated
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45 de parties existing in mid April 1999, without including in this number the formations of 
minorities, included in the data for 1990-1996); the Central Electoral Bureau (for the data of 
2000 and 2004). If after 2000, the number of minorities legally recognized was fixed at 18 
(the number of organizations being bigger, in the conditions where some of the minorities 
are represented by several formations), in exchange, the number of parties was reduced: 
January 1st 2003 there were 37 (cf. Roxana ANDRONIC, Bogdana PÄUN, "Legea partidelor 
nu sperie nici formatiunile de buzunar", Ziua, January 23, 2003), at the fixed term for the 
re-registration of parties -  that is July 18, 2003 -  there were 27 left, and July 15, 2004 there 
were 30 inscribed (cf. Stan STOICA, Dictionarul partidelor politice din Romania 1989-2004, IVth 
ed., Editura Meronia, Bucuresti, 2004, pp. 139-144). The column for the Chamber includes 
the formations of minorities. Since the European elections of 2007 BBC began to publish on 
each site of elections the list of the formations inscribed at the Tribunal.
Table 6
Party Sympathizers
Name of the party 01.07.2003 31.12.2007
1 Partidul National Liberal 120 115 116 134
2 Partidul Ecologist Roman 34 810 28 705
3 P. National Täränesc Crestin Democrat 56 163 35 602
4 Partidul Democrat 148 000 86 461
5 Partidul Social Democrat 300 000 290 116
6 Partidul Conservator 95 314 90 663
7 Actiunea Populara 33 365 -
8 Federatia Ecologista din Romania 44 348 R
9 Partidul Romania Mare 201 827 106 797
10 Partidul National Liberal Campeanu 28 391 R
11 Partidul Socialist al Muncii 61 052 R
12 Partidul Socialist al Renasterii Nationale 35 469 R
13 Partidul Unitatii Natiunii Romane 54 402 R
14 Partidul Alternativa Ecologista 31 041 26 588
15 Uniunea pentru Reconstructia Romaniei 32 380 R
16 Partidul Socialist Unit 44 081 R
17 Partidul Muncitoresc Roman 32 657 R
18 Partidul Lege si Ordine 28 440 -
19 Partidul Social Democrat C.Titel Petrescu 29 743 29 503
20 Partidul Noua Generatie 32 000 92 499
21 Partidul Socialist Roman 31 292 28 187
22 Partidul Popular si al Protectiei Sociale 50 000 38 836
23 Partidul Popular Crestin 27 696 R
24 Partidul Forta Dreptatii 65 994 -
25 Partidul Popular din Romania 65 000 26 068
26 Partidul National Democrat Crestin 26 138 29 031
27 Partidul Crestin Democrat 25 712 -
28 Partidul Renasterea Romaniei - 26 844
29 Partidul Alianta Socialista - 36 517
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Name of the party 01.07.2003 31.12.2007
30 Partidul Republican - 63 295
31 Forta Democratä - 31 724
32 Partidul Initiativa Nationalä - 25 941
33 Partidul Verde - 26 034
34 Partidul Liberal Democrat - 66 872
Total 1 735 430 1 302 417
The information in the table is taken from The register of political parties of April 2004, of 
the article of Lucian GHEORGHIU, "27 de partide au rämas in viata", Cotidianul, July 18,
2003 as from the documents entitled The register of political parties. Law no. 14/2003, pub­
lished by the Central Electoral Bureau with the occasion of the elections of June and Novem­
ber 2008. Of the 27 parties existing on July 1st, 2003, nine were erased from the Register of 
political parties, (a fact noted with an R in the table) because they have undergone proc­
esses of merger/absorption: it is the case of Federatia Ecologistä din Romania and Par- 
tidul Popular Crestin (erased at 27.11.2003 following its fusion with PNL), the Parti dul 
National Liberal Campeanu (erased 27.11.2003, following its fusion with PNL), the Par- 
tidul Socialist al Renasterii Nationale and Partidul Socialist al Muncii (erased 22.10.2003 
and respectively 05.12.2003, after they were absorbed by Partidul Social Democrat), the 
Partidul Unitätii Natiunii Romane (erased la 09.08.2006, after it was absorbed by the 
Partidul Conservator), the Uniunea pentru Reconstructia Romaniei (erased 10.03.2006, af­
ter it was absorbed by PNTCD), the Partidul Socialist Unit and Partidul Muncitoresc 
Roman (erased 07.04.2006 after they united under the name Partidul Stangii Unite). Other 
four parties, being quoted in the table with their actual denominations: it is the case of Par- 
tidul Umanist din Romania Social-Liberal which became since October 2005 Partidul Con­
servator, the Partidul Noua Democratie which changed its name inJanuary 2007 in Partidul 
Alternativa Ecologistä, the Partidul Pensionarilor si Protectiei Sociale, which preferred 
since October 2005 to be called Partidul Popular si al Protectiei Sociale and the Partidul 
Tineretului Democrat, which became since 2005 Partidul Lege si Ordine. Four existing par­
ties in 2003 did not submit lists at the end of 2007; in exchange, at the positions 28-34 of the 
table appear parties created after July 1st 2003, which presented signatures of the adherents 
in the term imposed by art. 27 of the law 14/2003. In total, January 1st, 2008 there were 21 
parties politically active which declared the number of their members. In the spring of 
2008, there were in the Register of parties, 11 political formations without having submitted 
lists with supporters at the end of 2007: Partidul Tinerilor din Romania (created in 2003 in 
the commune Voinesti of Dambovita), Partidul Demnitätii Nationale (created in February
2004 by an ex candidate for the presidential, Eduard Gheorghe Manole), Partidul Pentru 
Pa trie (politically active in the period 1996-2004), Uni unea Crestin So cialä (es tab lished in 
2004 under the name Blocul National Democrat), Forta Civicä (created in 2004 under the 
name of Partidul Crestin), Partidul Comunistilor Nepeceristi (created in 2006 in the village 
Urechesti of the commune Cicänesti in the county Arges), Partidul Popular Agrar (created 
in February 2006 in Bucharest), Miscarea Conservatoare din Romania (established in De­
cember 2006), Uniunea Popularä Social-Crestinä (created in November 2006), Partidul 
Romaniei Europene (created in January 2007), as the already recalled Partid al Stangii 
Unite, resulted from the merger of PSU-PMR. The Register records also the registration in 
March 2008 of the Partidul Civic Maghiar -  Magyar Polgari Part, and in August 2008 of the
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Partidul Uniunea Ecologistä din Romania, as the existence of four political alliances (Alianta 
Dreptate si Adevär -  Partidul National Liberal -  Partidul Democrat, then Alianta Partidul 
Popular European (Crestini Democrati) si Democrati Europeni, Alianta Uniunea Verde 
Ecologistä and Alianta Politicä PSD+PC. The decrease in the number of members from 
1 735 430 to 1 302 417 is explained by the reduction of these numbers for all parties, with the 
exception of two: PNG, which increases three times and PNTCD, with an increase of 3000 
members. In some cases, the phenomenon is hard to explain: for example, even though PSD 
absorbed two parties -  PSM and PSRN -  that had together almost 100 thousand members, 
the social-democrats decrease however from 300 to 290 thousand of sympathizers. With im­
portant quotas of confidence and on the first place at the Europeans of 2007, PD has a de­
crease from 148 thousands to 86 thousands of members: that is a diminution of over 40%, 
explained probably by the fact that the formation submitted lists only from 21 counties. The 
record belongs to PRM with a reduction of almost 50%. The distribution on counties holds its 
own surprises as results from table 6 bis.
Table 6 bis
Distribution o f  Sympathizers in Counties
Name NJ Minimal Maximum
PNL 41 CV 311 IF 724 SV 860 DJ 5 141 BV 5 176 CT 6 519
PER 37 TM 1 HD 1 GJ 6 BR 1 721 BC 2 211 B 2 862
PNTCD 40 VN 16 BR 80 MH 210 CL 2 555 TN 2 995 B 4 035
PD 21 CL 761 CV 927 BH 992 HD 6 673 B 10 967 BV 11 932
PSD 42 CV 772 HR 798 TR 1.653 NT16 074 DB 18 459 B 31 641
PC 40 TL 80 HR 157 CJ 257 VL 8 030 BC 8 900 GL 11 091
PRM 42 HR 194 SM 420 GR 710 NT 6 083 CT 6 455 SV 9 269
PAE 23 SB 724 MH 731 BZ 741 BV 1 755 TL 1 830 GL 5 249
PSDCTP 38 CS 1 GJ 1 SJ 2 AR 2 068 CT 2 240 B 4 648
PNG 41 CV 392 SJ 854 TM 879 OT 4 703 VN 4 867 B 5 166
PSR 33 GR 6 IS 9 SV 23 VL 1 704 GL 1 793 B 2 506
PPPS 30 SJ 294 BH 364 VS 455 TR 2 536 AG 2 658 B 4 455
PPR 36 AR 40 AG 40 BR 40 VL 1 520 BN 1 700 B 2 180
PNDC 34 BH 12 CJ 13 HR 24 DB 2 030 PH 2 459 DJ 4 497
PRR 23 TM 703 BR 720 TL 822 IS 1 492 B 2 457 VS 3 277
PAS 37 CV 20 SM 60 BV 75 GJ 1 828 CJ 2 175 HD 2 763
PR 25 TM 95 MH 318 BH 320 GR 3 653 VL 16 840 BT 17 340
FD 20 IF 337 BR 707 GJ 825 VN 2 010 B 2 241 TM 3 811
PIN 20 VL 797 BV 861 GL 904 IS 1 640 TM 1 640 MS 1 890
PV 25 TL 53 BC 283 BR 501 BV 1 635 B 2 056 GL 2 495
PLD 39 TL 119 SJ 146 IF 153 DB 3 674 VL 4 180 SV 4 505
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In table, I noted with NJ = the number of circumscriptions/counties from where come 
the sympathizers; Minim = the 3 counties with the smallest number of sympathizers 
(county/their number). At PNL lack all together the lists from Harghita and in Bucharest 
the liberals only have 1 769 members. PSD has lists in all the counties. At PNTCD, lists in 40 
counties, without Harghita and Covasna. At PRM all the counties but in Bucharest only
3 583. At PSDCTP are missing the counties Bihor, Covasna, Maramures si Sibiu. At PC, with­
out Salaj and Satu Mare and in Bucharest 1 409 members. At PNG is missing Harghita. PAS 
has in Bucharest only 1 872 (the fourth filial as dimension). At PR exists only two over-di­
mensioned branches: In Valcea and Botosani. PLD has no lists at Covasna, Buzau and 
Caras Severin, and in Bucharest it has 3 363 members.
Table 7
Parliamentary Forces (1990-2004)
Year of election
Senate Chamber of Deputies
A B A B C
1990 7 7 16 16 11
1992 8 12 7 12 13
1996 6 12 6 12 15
2000 5 7 5 7 18
2004 4 6 4 6 18
2008 4 5 4 5 18
The table indicates for the two Chambers of Parliament the total number of political 
forces that passed the electoral threshold, coalitions and alliances taken as a whole (A), the 
number of parties that entered the Senate or the Chamber, each member of the coalition 
taken separately (B) and the number of minor ity organizations other than UDMR that en­
tered the Chamber even though they did not pass the threshold (C). For 1990 the threshold 
was 0 but UDMR was still counted separately of the other minority formations.
Table 8
The Effective Number o f  Parties (1990-2008)
ELECTION N a N B N
1990 1,6297 1,6297 1,6297
1992 4,7502 5,6116 5,1809
1996 3,8936 5,9900 4,8293
2000 3,2273 3,6791 3,4532
2004 3,0321 4,6882 3,8602
2008 3,1986 3,1986 3,1986
AVERAGE 3,6920
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The table contains the values of the effective number of parties (N) calculated -  to de­
scribe the party system -  after the formula of Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera N = 1/E si2, 
where si is the proportion of the seats of the party I (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Pat terns of Democ- 
racy.cit., p. 79). Keeping in mind that the presence of minorities in the inferior Chamber 
complicates the system of representation, I made the calculation departing from the Senate 
(see Cristian PREDA, Romania postcomunista si Romania interbelica, Meridiane, Bucuresti, 
2002, pp. 51-52); I calcu lated two pa rame ters: NA and NB, taking into account first coali­
tions/alliances as a whole (NA) and then taking into account parliamentary parties sepa­
rately (NB), more precisely those parties that obtained at least 1% of parliamentary seats 
(cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy_cit., pp. 76-80); I determined than the parame­
ter of the effective number of parties (N) as an arithmetic mean of NA and NB. For 2004 I also 
calculated the parameter for the Senate (the values are inscribed in the table), but also for the 
Chamber; in this second case I took into consideration first the group of minorities as such, 
neglecting in the case of the second parame ter each formation taken separately, as none ob­
tained 1% of mandates; the values obtained this way (NA = 3.3322; NB = 4.0717 and 
N = 3.7019) are very close of the ones that resulted from the calculation made on the basis of 
the mandates of the Senate. More than this, the calculation N can be made by taking into ac­
count the Chambers reunited, more precisely the weight of parliamentary groups at the 
level of the Parliament reunited; the calculation is relevant because, although after the 2004 
elections, parties have quasi-identical power at the Senate and in the inferior Chamber, en­
suring the majority involves, in fact, different constraints in each Chamber as at the level of 
the Parliament reunited. Departing from the observation that of the 469 seats of Parliament 
reunited at the end of 2004 PSD held 159 (33.9%) PNL -  92 (19.62%), PD -  69 (14.71%), PRM 
also 69 (14.71%), UDMR -  32 (6.82%), PUR -  30 (6.40%), and the group of minorities 18 man­
dates (that is 3.84%), the value of N is 4.8333, indicating -  as the other values taken sepa­
rately for the Senate and the Chamber -  that we are dealing with a multi-party system 
without a dominant party. For 2008 I ignored the mandates of PC from the alliance Alianta 
PSD+PC, because the number was negligible -  one mandate at the Senate (the 4 of the Cham­
ber representing a little over 1%).
Table 9
Oversize o f the Legislative
Year Man dates
1990 397
1992 341
1996 343
2000 345
2004 332
2008 334
Optimum 282
The table indicate the mandates of the inferior Chamber, including the places granted 
to the minority formations and, on the last row the optimum dimensions of the legislative, 
departing from the rule "of the cubic root" (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy.. .cit., 
p. 151).
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Table 10
"Squandered" Votes (1992-2008)
Senate Chamber of Deputies
VVEPP VVE VI VI% VVEPP VVE VI VI%
1992 9 360 739 10 964 818 1 604 079 14,63 8 765 014 10 880 252 2 115 238 19,45
1996 10 239 125 12 287 671 2 048 546 16,67 10 049 643 12 238 746 2 189 103 17,89
2000 8 723 251 10 891 910 2 168 659 19,92 8 464 543 10 839 424 2 374 881 21,91
2004 9 081 077 10 231 476 1 150 399 11,24 8 866 774 10 188 106 1 321 332 12,96
2008 6 396 804 6 888 055 491 251 7,13 6 466 288 6 886 794 420 506 6,10
In the first column is indicated the year of the election. VVEP indicates the total number 
of valid votes expressed for the parties that passed the electoral threshold. VVE is the total 
number of valid votes expressed. VI means squandered votes, that is, granted to parties that 
could not pass the threshold, in absolute numbers (VI). VI% is the percentage of squandered 
votes from the total of valid votes expressed.
Table 11
Electoral Bonus fo r  the Winners o f  Elections
Year Chamber Senate
1990 - 0,07 +10,29
1992 +6,60 +5,97
1996 +5,40 +6,37
2000 +8,31 +9,33
2004 +4,48 +3,13
2008 +1,04 +1,61
We indicate here the bonus granted to the party that was first in the classification -  Frontul 
Salvarii Nationale (1990), Frontul Democrat al Salvarii Nationale (1992), Conventia Democrata 
Romänä (1996), Polul Democrat-Social din Romania (2000), Uniunea nationala PSD+PUR 
(2004), Alianta Politica PSD+PC (2008) -  calculated as a difference between the percentage of 
seats and the percentage of votes obtained.
Table 12
The Number o f  Mandates and their Allocation (1992-2008)
Senate Chamber of Deputies
MS MSR %MSR MD MDR %MDR
1992 143 94 65,74 341 125 36,66
1996 143 85 59,45 343 118 34,41
2000 140 72 51,43 345 110 31,89
2004 137 71 51,82 314 71 22,61
2008 137 65 47,44 315 70 22,22
The first column indicates the year of elections. The following three specify the total 
number of senator mandates (MS), the number of mandates of senator allocated after the 
redistribution of votes obtained by the formations that do not reach the threshold (MSR)
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and, respectively the percentage of mandates of senator allocated as a result of redistribu­
tion (%MSR). The last three columns contain the total number of mandates of deputy, with­
out the ones of minorities (MD), the number of mandates of deputy allocated after 
redistribution (MDR) and the percentage of mandates of deputy allocated as a result of re­
distribution (%MDR). For 2008 I introduced in the columns MSR and MDR all the man­
dates allocated in the second stage of allocation, at the national level.
Table 13
Electoral Disproportionality (1990-2008)
G l G P
1990 7,86 93,19
1992 5,88 38,66
1996 7,03 45,59
2000 9,38 33,17
2004 4,98 48,77
2008 4,36 -
Means 6,58 51,88
The table contains the parameters of legislative disproportionality (GL) and presidential 
disproportionality (GP) for the period 1990-2008, as well as, on the last row, the average val­
ues of these ones; the general value of G, calculated as a geometrical mean of the two parame­
ters is G=18.47. The parameter of legislative disproportionality was calculated after the 
formula of Michael Gallagher GL = V/ £ (vi-li)2, where vi = the percentage of votes obtained 
by a party and L = the percentage of seats obtained by that party, taking into account all the 
parties that obtained minimum 1%; for the entire period, the table contains the data calcu­
lated departing from the result of elections at the Senate; in fact, for 2004, the parameter of 
legislative disproportionality has values very close if it is calculated for the Senate (4.98), re­
spectively for the Chamber (4.31). In 2008 the difference is somewhat bigger: 3.27 for the 
Chamber and 4.36 for the Senate. Presidential disproportionality is equal to the score of the 
defeated candidate in the second tour of elections. For 1990-2000 the calculations can be 
found in the volume Cristian PREDA, Romania postcomunista. . .cit., pp. 59-60.
Table 14
Mandates, First Places and Majorities in 2008
Cham. Dep. Senate
Party M L1 MAJ M L1 MAJ
PSD 114 117 40 51 55 12
PDL 115 138 27 49 58 11
PNL 65 37 4 28 15 1
UDMR 22 23 14 9 9 7
Total 316 315 85 137 137 31
M is the number of mandates, L1 is the number of first places won in colleges. MAJ is 
the number of colleges won with more than half of the votes in colleges. In the table, PSD 
appears together with its ally, PC. The difference between L1 and M in the case of the Cham­
ber of Deputies is explained by the increase of the magnitude of the circumscription of 
Arad with one seat.
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Table 14 bis
Allocation o f  Mandates on Counties in 2008
County Chamber of Deputies Sen ateM JUD 50%+1 M JUD 50%+1
AB 5 4 3 PDL 2 0 0
AR 8 5 5 PDL 3 2 2 PDL
AG 9 7 3 PSD 4 3 2 PSD
BC 10 9 2 PSD 4 3 1 PSD
BH 9 7 2 UDMR 4 2 1 UDMR
BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0
BT 6 4 0 3 2 0
BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0
BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD
BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0
CS 5 3 0 2 0 0
CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0
CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL
CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD
CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDMR
DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL
DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD
GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD
GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL
GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0
HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDMR
HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0
IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0
IS 12 11 0 5 3 0
IF 4 3 0 2 0 0
MM 7 5 0 3 2 0
MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL
MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDMR
NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL
OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD
PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0
SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDMR
SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0
SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0
SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL
TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD
TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL
TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL
VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0
VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD
VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD
B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0
43 4 2 0 2 1 0
Total 315 245 85 137 72 31
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M is the magnitude, that is, the number of deputies/senators on circumscription. JUD 
designates the number of mandates allocated at the level of the county. On the column 
50%+1 appears the number of mandates allocated following the "direct" victory, with mini­
mum 50%+1 of the votes of the college. In Arad, the magnitude for CD fixed by the law was 
7, being increased with one mandate after the elections. In what regards the numbers of the 
column JUD, they differ from the data of BEC in the case of CV for the Chamber and in the 
cases of AR, CV, HR, MH, SM, and TL for the Senate in the sense in which at BEC appears 
in each case with one unity less. The explication is simple: in these cases, BEC ignored one 
directly won mandate because the party of winners did not reunite at the level of the 
county the corresponding electoral coefficient. The mandates won with minimum 50%+1 
are still won at the level of the circumscription and thus they appear in the table. The 85 
mandates won "directly" at the Chamber pertain 40 PSD 27 PDL, 14 UDMR and 4 PNL, 
while the 31 of the Senate were won 12 by PSD, 11 by PDL, 7 by UDMR and one by PNL.
Table 14-3
Parties and Mandates in the Bucharest Circumscription
Col. I II III M
1 PDL 4 828 PSD 4 182 PNL 3 793 PNL
2 PDL 4 778 PSD 3 931 PNL 3 653 PNL
3 PDL 5 431 PNL 4 749 PSD 4 711 PNL
4 PDL 10 845 PSD 8 093 PNL 5 195 PDL
5 PDL 6 577 PSD 6 013 PNL 3 249 PSD
6 PSD 8 790 PDL 7 070 PNL 2 393 PSD
7 PDL 6 930 PSD 6 711 PNL 2 690 PSD
8 PDL 7 936 PSD 5 809 PNG 4 101 PDL
9 PDL 8 531 PSD 6 069 PNL 3 781 PDL
10 PDL 7 004 PSD 4 659 PNL 2 837 PDL
11 PDL 8 127 PSD 4 379 PNL 2 394 PDL
12 PDL 8 362 PSD 5 445 PNL 2 246 PDL
13 PDL 8 160 PSD 5 429 PNL 1 700 PDL
14 PDL 8 019 PSD 5 656 PNL 2 333 PDL
15 PDL 8 723 PSD 3 616 PNL 1 188 PDL
16 PDL 5 730 PSD 5 128 PNL 2 639 PSD
17 PSD 4 773 PDL 4 607 PNL 2 011 PSD
18 PSD 9 038 PDL 7 066 PNL 3 441 PSD
19 PSD 11 530 PDL 9 774 PNL 2 599 PSD
20 PSD 12 214 PDL 5 301 PNG 3 600 PSD
21 PSD 5 557 PDL 4 853 PNL 2 593 PSD
22 PSD 3 938 PDL 3 323 PNL 3 315 PNL
23 PSD 10 415 PDL 4 907 PNL 2 144 PSD
24 PDL 8 729 PSD 7 023 PNL 3 819 PDL
25 PDL 11 385 PSD 7 471 PNL 4 313 PDL
26 PDL 6 234 PSD 4 919 PNL 3 642 PSD
27 PDL 6 291 PSD 4 706 PNL 3 069 PNL
28 PDL 7 546 PSD 5 213 PNL 2 452 PDL
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On the first column (Col) appears the number of the college. On columns I, II and III -  
the occupiers of the first place, the second and the third, as the number of votes obtained. M 
indicates the party to which the mandate was allocated with italics being marked the cases 
in which candidates obtained the mandate with minimum 50%+1.
Table 15
Parties that Passed at Least 3 Electoral Tests
Party
1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
CD S CD S CD S CD S CD S CD S
PSD
263 92
117 49 91 41 139 59 113 46 110 48
PDL 43 18 43 22 31 13 48 21 115 51
PRM - - 16 6 19 8 84 37 48 21 - -
PNL 29 9 - - 25 16 30 13 64 28 65 28
PSDR 2 - 10 1 10 1 10 3 - - - -
UDMR 29 12 27 12 25 11 27 12 22 10 22 9
PNTCD 12 1 41 21 83 27 - - - - - -
PUNR 9 2 30 14 18 7 - - - - - -
PER 8 1 4 - 5 1 - - - - - -
PC - - - - - - 6 3 19 11 4 1
The table indicates the number of parliamentary mandates obtained either individu­
ally, either in coalitions by the parties that passed three out of the five electoral tests, indif­
ferently if they are still in Parliament or not (this is how is explained the fact that appear 
here PNTCD and PUNR, absent of the first two legislatures) and indifferent of the fact if 
they still exist or not (PSDR, for example merged in 2001 with PSDR under the name PSD). 
I used the present acronyms (and not, for example FDSN -  the name that PDSR had at the 
1992 elections). For the year 1990 I mentioned, both at the Chamber (CD) as in the Senate 
(S), the mandates obtained by FSN, of which were detached PSD and PD.
Table 16
The Scores o f  the Political Families o f  Romania (1990-2008)
1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Average
Greens
2,62 MER 
1,69 PER
0,98 PER* 
2,25 MER
1,24 PER* 
0,25 FER*
0,84 PER 0,72 FER 0,26 PVE
1,81
4,31 3,23 1,49 0,84 0,72 0,26
Communists & 
extreme left
0,38 PDM 3,04 PSM 2,29 PS 
2,15 PSM 
1,73 PSMR
0,71 PSM 
0,48 PMR
0,44 PSU 
0,35 PMR 
0,25 PAS 
0,28 PSR
0
2,02
0,38 3,04 6,17 1,19 1,32 0
Agrarian
minimalists
1,83 PDAR 2,99 PDAR 
0,45 PNT
0,84 PNT 0,43 PNT 0 0
1,09
1,83 3,44 0,84 0,43 0 0
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1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Average
Social-democrats
66,31 FSN 
1,05 PSoDR 
0,53 PSDR
27,72 FDSN 
2,40 PSDR* 
10,19 FSN 
0,87 PsoDR
21,52 PDSR 
10,48 PD* 
2,44 PSDR*
36,61 PDSR 
7,03 PD
36,61 PSD 
0,78 FD 
0,21 PND 
0,2 PSDCTP
33,09 PSD
43,07
67,89 41,18 34,44 43,64 37,80 33,09
Liberals and 
conservatives
maximalist and
modernist
6,41 PNL 
0,27 ULB 
0,15 PLLR
3,12 PAC* 
2,64 PNLAT* 
2,63 PNL 
0,72 PNLCD* 
0,58 NPL 
0,51 ULB
6,18 PNL* 
1,24 PNLCD* 
1,57 ANL 
0,79 ANLE 
0,08 PLC
6,89 PNL 
4,07 APR 
1,40 PNLC 
0,45 PLDR 
0,03 ULB
31, 33 ADA 18,57 PNL 
32,36 PDL
20,33
6,83 10,20 9,86 12, 84 31,33 50,93
Agrarian, 
Christian 
populists and/or 
identitarian right
2,56 PNTCD 10,01 PNTCD* 20,51 PNTCD* 
0,74 PAR*
5,04 CDR 
2000
1,86 PNTCD 
0,47 AP 
0,32 URR
0
6,92
2,56 10,01 21,25 5,04 2,65 0
National-populists 
on an ethnic or 
religious basis, 
extreme right
2,12 PUNR 7,72 PUNR 
3,89 PRM
4,46 PRM 
4,35 PUNR
19,48 PRM 
1,38 PAN
12,99 PRM 
2,24 PNG 
0,52 PUNR 
0,27 PNDC
3,15 PRM 
2,27 PNG
10,81
2,12 11,61 8,81 20,86 16,02 5,42
Defenders of 
specific interests, 
diverse
0,48 GDC 
0,34 PLS 
0,32 PRNR 
0,32 PTLDR
1,63 PR 
0,73 SND
1,44 PPR 
0,87 GDC
0,66 PPR 0,18 APCD 
0,16 PTD 
0,18 other
0,12 PPCD
1,24
1,46 2,36 2,31 0,66 0,52 0,12
Minorities
7,23 UDMR 
0,99 other
7,46 UDMR 
1,43 other
6,63 UDMR 
1,71 other
6,80 UDMR 
2,57 other
6,19 UDMR 
2,88 other
6,17 UDMR 
3,45 other 8,92
8,22 8,89 8,34 9,37 9,07 9,62
I took into consideration the categories of party families defined by Christian 
VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo MEDINA LOCKHART, "La geographie electorale de l'Europe 
centre-orientale", in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partis politiques et democraties...cit., 
pp. 17-34. The results are those for the Chamber of Deputies, the scores being calculated on 
the basis of performances of one or several parties that participated alone or in alliances 
(this last case is indicated with the help of an asterisk, the score being deducted proportion­
ally with the weight of the respective formation in alliance). I used the following acro­
nyms: ADA = Alianta Dreptate si Adevär (PNL-PD); ANL = Alianta Nationalä Liberalä; 
ANLE = Alianta National-Liberalä Ecologistä; AP = Actiunea Popularä; APCD = Alianta 
Popular Crestin Democratä (PPR+Partidul Renasterea Romaniei); APR = Alianta pentru 
Romania; CDR 2000 = Conventia Democratä Romanä 2000; FD = Forta Democratä din 
Romania; FDSN = Frontul Democrat al Salvärii Nationale; FER = Federatia Ecologistä din 
Romania; FSN = Frontul Salvärii Nationale; GDC = Gruparea Democraticä de Centru; 
NPL = Noul Partid Liberal; MER = Miscarea Ecologistä din Romania; PAC = Partidul 
Aliantei Civice; PAN = Partidul Alianta Nationalä (ex-PUNR + PNR = Partidul National 
Roman); PAR = Partidul Alternativa Romaniei; PAS = Partidul Alianta Socialistä; PD = Par­
tidul Democrat (ex-FSN); PDAR = Partidul Democrat-Agrar din Romania; PDM = Parti­
dul Democrat al Muncii; PDSR = Partidul Democratiei Sociale din Romania (ex-FDSN);
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PER = Partidul Ecologist din Romania; PLC= Partidul Liberal Crestin; PLDR = Partidul 
Liberal Democrat Roman (ex-PNLCD); PLLR = Partidul Liberal (al Libertätii) din Romania; 
PLS = Partidul Liber-Schimbist; PMR = Partidul Muncitoresc Roman; PND = Partidul 
Noua Democratie; PNDC = Partidul National Democrat Crestin; PNG = Partidul Noua 
Generatie; PNL = Partidul National Liberal; PNLAT = Partidul National-Liberal Aripa 
Tanärä; PNLC = Partidul National Liberal Campeanu; PNLCD = Partidul National Liberal 
Conventia Democratä; PNT = Partidul National Täränesc; PNTCD = Partidul National 
Täränesc Crestin-Democrat; PPCD = Partidul Popular si al Protectiei Sociale din Romania; 
PPR = Partidul Pensionarilor din Romania; PR = Partidul Republican; PRM = Partidul 
Romania Mare; PRNR = Partidul Reconstructiei Nationale din Romänia; PS = Partidul 
Socialist; PSD = Partidul Social Democrat (PDSR+PSDR); PSDCTP = Partidul Social De­
mocrat Constantin Titel Petrescu; PSDR = Partidul Social-Democrat Roman; PSM = Par­
tidul Socialist al Muncii; PSMR = Partidul Socialist Muncitoresc Roman; PSoDR = Partidul 
Socialist Democratic Roman; PSR = Partidul Socialist Roman; PSU = Partidul Socialist 
Unit; PTD = Partidul Tineretului Democrat; PTLDR = Partidul Tineretului Liber Democrat 
din Romania; PUNR = Partidul Unitätii Nationale a Romanilor/Partidul Unitätii Natiunii 
Romane; PUR = Partidul Umanist din Romania; PVE = Partidul Verde Ecologist, aliantä a 
PER si Partidului Verde; UDMR = Uniunea Democratä a Maghiarilor din Romania; 
SND = Solidaritatea National-Democratä; ULB = Uniunea Liberalä Brätianu; URR = Uni- 
unea pentru Reconstructia Romaniei.
Table 17
Governmental Formulas and Parliamentary Majorities (1990-2004)
Government formula Parliamentary majority
Composition Votes Man­dates Composition Votes
Man­
dates
1990-1991 FSN 66,31 66,24 FSN 66,31 66,24
1991-1992 FSN+PNL 72,72 73,54 FSN+PNL 72,72 73,54
1992-1996 FDSN 27,71 34,31 FDSN+PRM+PUNR+PSM 42,34 51,60
1996-2000 CDR+USD+UDMR 49,71 58,29 CDR+USD+UDMR 49,71 58,29
2000-2004 PSD+PUR 36,61 44,92 PSD+PUR+UDMR 43,40 52,74
2004-2007 DA+UDMR+PUR 44,70 46,18 DA+UDMR+PUR+minorities 46,87 51,60
2007-2008 PNL+UDMR 24,18 22,50 PNL+UDMR+PSD+PC+minorities 63,66 79,00
2008- PDL+PSD 65,65 66,96 PDL+PSD 65.65 66,96
The table designates the votes and mandates obtained in the Chamber of Deputies. I took 
into account the composition of governments as that of majorities at the beginning of the 
mandate without considering neither the intra-parliament mobility, nor the repositioning 
such as that of PUR -  which remained in the government formula of 2000-2004 with PSD 
only until 2003. I did not distinguish between the three governments of 1996-2000 (led by 
Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isarescu), because their parliamentary support was 
identical. I distinguished nonetheless between the two Tariceanu governments very differ­
ent one from another.
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Table 18
The Evolution o f the Mandates o f Parties in the Period 2004-2008
PARTID 28.12.2004 03.04.2007 01.12.2008CD S CD+S CD S CD+S CD S CD+S
PSD 113 46 159 107 43 150 105 43 146
PNL 64 28 92 51 22 73 60 24 78
PD* 48 21 69 50 21 71 67 23 76
PRM 48 21 69 30 17 47 21 16 45
UDMR 22 10 32 22 10 32 22 10 32
PUR (PC) 19 11 30 19 12 31 19 10 26
Minorities 18 0 18 18 0 18 18 0 18
Indep.** 0 0 0 32 12 44 13 11 42
Total*** 332 137 469 329 137 466 323 137 460
The data considered in the table are 28.12.2004 -  the investiture of the 2nd Tariceanu 
cabinet; 03.09.2007 -  the beginning of the last parliamentary session of the 2004-2008 legis­
lature and, respectively 01.12.2008, the end of the legislature. Some supplementary specifi­
cations: * of February 2008 -  PDL; ** among the independents April 3, 2007, 26 belonged to 
PLD, 18 at the Chamber and 8 at the Senate; *** -  the 3 missing mandates at 03.04.2007, re­
spectively the 6 missing mandates at 03.09.2007 are a consequence of the freeing of some 
posts occupied by the members of the Alianta DA. At the end of the legislature there were 
9 vacant mandates at the Chamber.
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